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A RULE IN SEARCH OF A REASON: AN EMPIRICAL 
REEXAMINATION OF eH/MEL AND BELTON 
MYRON MOSKOVITZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose police officers obtain a warrant to arrest Dan for, say, an 
assault that occurred during a fistfight at a neighborhood bar. They go 
to Dan's home. His wife lets them in, and they fmd Dan in his 
bedroom, in bed. They arrest him, handcuff him behind his back, take 
him out of the room, and lock him in a police car. Then one of the 
officers searches the nightstand next to the bed, fmding narcotics in the 
drawer. Dan is charged with possession of illegal narcotics. His lawyer 
moves to suppress the narcotics. She concedes that the arrest was valid 
but argues that the narcotics were obtained by an illegal search. The 
prosecutor makes no claim that the police had a warrant to search the 
premises, that the police had probable cause to believe that evidence of a 
crime would be found in the bedroom, that the police searched in order 
to protect themselves from weapons, or that Dan or his wife consented 
to the search. 
Who wins? 
Or suppose Dan was arrested (on the same warrant) while driving a 
car. He is removed from the car, handcuffed, and locked in a police 
car. The officer returns to Dan's car, searches the glove compartment, 
and finds narcotics. Dan's lawyer moves to suppress them. 
Who wins? 
According to many appellate decisions, both motions should be 
denied, on the ground that the searches were "incident" to the arrest, 
because the nightstand and the glove compartment were within Dan's 
reach when he was arrested-though not when the searches took place. 
But why? The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable 
searches." Snooping through Dan's bedroom furniture and glove 
compartment are certainly "searches"-because Dan has a "justifiable"! 
"expectation of privacy,,2 in both places. Why does the fact that Dan 
was recently arrested near these places make the searches "reasonable"? 
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. Many thanks to the following 
professors for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article: Sandy 
Kadish, Ron Allen, Dick Frase, George Thomas, Chris Slobogin, Craig Bradley, Bill 
Pizzi, Peter Keane, Bob Calhoun, and Charles Weisselberg. 
1. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). 
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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The stress of the arrest might have caused Dan to reach into nearby 
areas for a weapon to attack the police, but that danger evaporated when 
Dan was removed from the scene of the arrest. So, why allow the 
police to search the area of the arrest after the arrestee is gone? 
The source of this problem may be found in one of the most 
Significant Fourth Amendment cases ever decided by the United States 
Supreme Court-a case well known for its restriction on the authority of 
police to search incident to an arrest. The problem lies with Chimel v. 
California. 3 
I. CHIMEL 
Police officers obtained· a· warrant to arrest Chimel for burglarizing 
a coin shop.4 No search warrant was issued.s They went to his home to 
arrest him.6 His wife let them in, and Chimel· arrived a few minutes 
later. 7 The officers arrested him when he "entered the house"-
presumably near the front door..s The officers then searched "the entire 
three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small 
workshop.,,9 The search of some rooms was "relatively cursory," but 
when the officers searched the master bedroom and sewing room, they 
asked Chimel' s wife to open drawers and to move items within them. 10 
A number of stolen coins were seized in the course of the search of 
those rooms. 11 
The Supreme Court held that Chimel's motion to suppress the coins 
should have been granted. The Court began by quoting the fundamental 
principle it had established just a year earlier in Terry v. Ohio: "'[t]he 
scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered· its initiation permissible. ,,,12 Applying 
this principle, the Court held in Chimel: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any 
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist 
3. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
4. Id. at 753. 
5. Id. at 754. 
6. Id. at 753. 
7. Id. 
8. See id. 
9. Id. at 754. 
10. [d. 
11. [d. 
12. Id. at 762 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 
(1968». 
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arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety 
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In 
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in 
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area 
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon 
or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like 
rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is 
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one 
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is 
ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's 
person and the area "within his immediate control"-
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he 
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 
There is no comparable justification, however, for 
routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest 
occurs-or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk 
. drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. 
Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, 
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. 
The "adherence to judicial processes" mandated by the Fourth 
Amendment requires no less. 
Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the 
facts of this case produces a clear result. The search here 
went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from 
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or 
something that could have been used as evidence against him. 
There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a 
search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. 
The scope of the search was, therefore, "unreasonable" under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the petitioner's 
conviction cannot stand. 13 
659 
This language lays down two rules: a "negative" rule and a 
"positive" rule. The "negative" rule establishes where the police may 
not search, and the "positive" rule establishes where they may search. 
The "negative" rule seems quite sensible. There is no good reason 
to allow the police to search areas beyond the arrestee's reach, simply 
because he was arrested; such a search is "unreasonable" under the 
13. [d. at 762-63, 768. 
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Fourth Amendment. 14 Since the police violated Chimel's rights under 
this "negative" rule, the search was illegal; the resulting evidence 
should have been suppressed, and the conviction should have been 
reversed-which it was. Thus, the "negative" rule was essentially the 
"holding" of the case. 
The "positive" rule, however, was not essential to the Court's 
opmlOn. Arguably, it was mere dicta. The Court might have said, 
"there was no justifiable reason for the police to search the master 
bedroom and sewing room where the evidence was found. Therefore, 
that search was unreasonable. We leave for another day the question of 
where the police are allowed to search 'incident to an arrest. '" 
Unfortunately, the Court did not say this. Instead, the Court established 
a new rule with far-reaching consequences: the police may search "the 
arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control. ",15 
This was a mistake. The Court did not carefully examine whether 
this rule was consistent with the Court's own rationale (probably 
because the Court was more concerned with establishing its negative 
rule).16 The rule was n<;>tconsistent-at least in part. 
There are two halves to the "positive" rule: (1) the police may 
search "the arrestee's person," and (2) the police may search "the area 
within his immediate control." The first half is consistent with the 
Court's rationale. The arrestee might have a weapon hidden in his 
clothing, and the weapon might be too small (e.g., a razor blade or 
small knife) to be detected by a "frisk" (a patdown of the outer 
clothing). Even if the arrestee is handcuffed-including behind his 
back-he might be able to reach the weapon and use it to attack the 
police officers. The weapon and its user will be in close proximity to 
the police for an extended period of time: during escort to the police 
car, transportation in the police car to the police station, removal from 
the car, booking, etc. The weapon might be surreptitiously drawn and 
employed against the officers at any of these points because the weapon 
14. In a particular case, there might be other reasons to allow such a search. 
Indeed, in Chimel, Justice White dissented, arguing that the police had probable cause to 
believe that Chimel had stolen property in his house, and that "exigent circumstances" 
prevented them from getting a search warrant before Chimel's wife might hide the 
evidence. [d. at 773-74 (White, J., dissenting). 
15. [d. at 763. 
16. In Harris v. United States, the Court validated the search of an entire 
apartment incident to an arrest in that apartment. 331 U.S. 145, 148 (1947); cf United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950) (validating the search of an office incident 
to the arrest of an employee in that office) (citing Harris, 331 U.S. 145). In Chimel, the 
Court spent a good part of its opinion explaining why Harris and Rabinowitz should 
have been overruled. See, e.g., Chimel, 752 U.S. at 757-61. For a summary of the 
Supreme Court cases leading up to Chimel, see State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947,953 (N.J. 
1994). 
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goes wherever the arrestee goes. So does evidence (a small amount of 
narcotics, perhaps) that might be destroyed en route to a police station. 
A search of the arrestee's person for evidence will cause only a small 
additional intrusion on his privacy; he is likely to be placed in a jail cell, 
o at least temporarily, and his jailors are entitled to search him before 
jailing him. On the other hand, the danger to the police is high (serious 
injury or death) if the arrestee has a weapon. Therefore, the "search 
incident to arrest" doctrine should validate a search of the arrestee's 
person, even in the absence of information indicating that he, in fact, 
has a weapon or evidence on him. This is what the Supreme Court later 
held in United States v. Robinson. 17 
A search of the area around the arrestee at the time of the arrest-
the area within his "wingspan" or "lunge area"-is quite another matter. 
That area does not go with him to the police station. If the arrestor can 
justify a search of that area, the justification cannot be the same as the 
one underlying the person search. 
Chimel's justification for a search of that area appears to be based 
on two assumptions: (1) that the arrestee might be inclined to reach into 
that area for a weapon or evidence, and (2) that the arrestee would be 
able to reach into that area. The first assumption might be correct, but 
the second assumption is not correct. Because it is incorrect, a whole 
body of subsequent law has been built on a false foundation. 
I am not a police officer. Nevertheless, from a lay perspective, I 
have always been puzzled by this second assumption. If I were a police 
officer and had even the slightest fear that the person I just arrested 
might reach into a nearby drawer, etc., for a weapon or piece of 
evidence, what would I do? Would I allow him to stand there 
unrestrained while I searched that area? Of course not. He might attack 
me or flee while I was searching. 1 would immediately restrain him and 
remove him from the area that might contain the reachable weapon or 
evidence. Since I would be taking him to the police station anyway, I 
might as well begin that "transportation" process right away. I can 
think of exceptions that might occasionally arise (e.g., where the 
arrestee is not dressed and needs to reach into a drawer to get some 
clothing),18 but this would not be the usual situation. And if in an 
unusual case I decided not to restrain him because he did not pose a 
17. 414 u.s. 218, 235 (1973). 
18. See United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Where 
a person in custody asks to be given access to an area, he has no basis to object that the 
arresting officers conducted a protective search to secure the area prior to granting his 
request. "); see also Watkins v. United States, 564 F.2d 201, 205 (6th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1973); Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 
F.2d 1238, 1247 (6th Cir. 1971); People v. Jones, 767 P.2d 236, 238 (Colo. 1989). 
662 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
threat (e.g., because he was injured, feeble, or disabled), then that very 
reason would preclude him from reaching for a weapon or evidence. 19 
The Justices who decided Chimel were not police officers either, 
yet they also implicitly made an assumption: that the police need to 
search the area because the arrestee is usually present and unrestrained 
during the search. They cited no studies, expert testimony, or other 
evidence to support their assumption.20 
If the Court's assumption is wrong, then the entire foundation for 
the "area search incident to arrest" doctrine collapses. If the arrestee is 
normally unable to reach into the area around him, then there should be 
no general rule allowing the police to search that area after the arrest-
even if the search is "contemporaneous" with the arrest. If Chimel falls, 
then so does a large body of case law that built upon Chimel, and this 
case law is very important in the real world. The United States Customs 
Service has stated: "By far the most important and most extensively 
utilized exception to the search warrant requirement is the search 
incident to a lawful arrest. ,,21 
Who is right-the Court or me? I have tried to find out, but it has 
not been easy. 
19. See United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155, 1164 (5th Cir. 1972) (Tuttle, 
J., dissenting) (" [T]he agents neither drew their guns nor attempted to shackle appellant 
or render him immobile. Plainly the agents themselves must have believed that appellant 
was not in a position to grab a weapon or seize destructible evidence. "); see also United 
States v. Erwin, 507 F.2d 937, 939 (5th Cir. 1975) ("They cannot allow the arrestee 
freedom of movement, and then later use that freedom to justify an exploratory search of 
the dwelling. "). 
20. Judge Posner has stated, "It is the lack of an empirical footing that is and 
always has been the Achilles heel of constitutional law, not the lack of a good 
constitutional theory." Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 1, 21 (1998); see also David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-
Finding ": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 541 (1991); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: 
Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 90 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 736 (2000) ("The most current and 
reliable empirical and social scientific evidence must inform the normative judgments at 
the heart of constitutional criminal procedure. "). 
21. U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., SPECIAL AGENT HANDBOOK: CHAPTER 42, SEARCH & 
SEIZURE 13 (n.d.); see also CITY OF CLEVELAND DEP'T. OF PUB. SAFETY, REGULATIONS 
PART IV: SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST 2 (n.d.) ("The search incident to arrest 
is one of the earliest recognized exceptions to the written requirement. More searches 
are carried out under this exception than any other. H); David E. Aaronson & Rangeley 
Wallace, A Reconsideration Of the Founh Amendment's Doctrine of Search Incident to 
Arrest, 64 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (1975) ("The finding of a 1967 study that more than 90 
percent of all searches receiving court consideration were incident to an arrest indicates 
that the exception virtually has swallowed the warrant requirement of the fourth 
amendment. "). 
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A. What the Police Do 
I do, of course, know some police officers. Some have been 
students of mine. When I have asked them the first thing they do after 
arresting someone in a home, the answer has been unanimous: 
"Handcuff him, and get him out of there." An FBI agent told me the 
same thing. 
This information is helpful, but not quite a scientific study. I asked 
our law librarian to send me some books about law enforcement 
techniques, materials used by police training academies, and the like, so 
I could read what police officers were instructed to do after an arrest. If 
our law school library did not have such materials (it did not), then the 
librarian could get them from other libraries. I had no such luck. 
How can this be? A nation with thousands of law enforcement 
agencies and police officers would seem to be an excellent market for 
professional training guides. Someone must produce such materials, and 
someone must make money from them. Librarians, who fervently 
believe iIi sharing knowledge and know how to find available materials, 
should be able to find them if anyone can. Our librarian could get 
nothing-not even from libraries likely to have such materials (such as 
the library at the California Department of Justice). 
The answer, it turns out, is that law enforcement agencies generally 
try to keep these materials secret. Their reason is, I suppose, 
reasonable: if crooks learn about police techniques, they might also 
learn to avoid or counteract them. Even book publishers will not make 
books on police techniques available . to people outside of law 
enforcement. 22 
I was pretty much stymied-until a colleague23 suggested that I send 
requests under "freedom of information" and "public records" laws to 
various police agencies. I looked up the California and federal statutes 
that deal with this. Both, however, contain exemptions for documents 
revealing law enforcement techniques. 24 My experience with 
bureaucracies has taught me that if you simply ask for something you 
have no right to get, they might send it to you anyway. I decided that if 
I sent out enough requests, at least a few might slip through the cracks 
in the stone wall I'd been facing so far. All it would cost me was a bit 
of stationary, postage, and, perhaps, some copying costs. 
22. Even at full price, one publisher refused to sell me its police books. 
23. Professor Charles Weisselberg, at Boalt Hall. 
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 6254(f) (West. Supp. 
2002). Other states have similar exemptions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
119.07(3)(d) (West 1996); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(2)(c)-(d) (Anderson 
2001). 
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I sent out requests. I wrote to the police departments of 
California's larger cities (about thirty), California sheriffs departments 
(about fifty), about a dozen federal law enforcement agencies, and some 
state and municipal police departments around the country (about thirty). 
Here is what I asked for: 
I hereby request copies of all public records, writings, 
audiotapes, videotapes, and documents that are used to train 
law enforcement officers in how to perform a search incident 
to the arrest of a suspect. I am more interested in practical 
advice given to officers than in advice about the law. For 
example, should the officer handcuff the suspect and remove 
him from the area (for officer safety) before searching the 
area? I plan to use these materials for academic research. 25 
From the fall of 2000 through the spring of 2001, I received timely 
and courteous responses from most (though not all) recipients. A few, 
although not as many as I had expected, invoked a statutory exemption 
and gave me nothing. Many gave me training materials about the law of 
search and seizure, despite my request for "practical advice" rather than 
legal advice. This might have been deliberate-a devious way of 
invoking the exemption by giving me harmless material-or perhaps 
when they saw a letter from a law professor they incorrectly assumed 
that I wanted law. Some sent me training materials that dealt with issues 
other than the one I cared about. 
Several training officers phoned me to clarify what I wanted, and 
our conversations were often very helpful. I explained to them that the 
law permitted them to do any number of things during an arrest, and I 
wanted to know what they actually did. Many said they had little or 
nothing in writing, and that most training on the issues I mentioned was 
given orally by training officers. I was skeptical about this at first, but I 
was told this by so many independent sources that I came to believe it. 
One training officer told me, "the average cop doesn't like to read 
much. Give him a book and he'll put it on a shelf. They like to learn by 
listening to more experienced officers." What about the interrogation 
manuals that the Supreme Court assumed in Miranda v. Arizona 26 were 
generally used by the police? I was told: "Those were used by 
detectives, who do read. They are specialists, not beat cops, who are 
generalists and not academically inclined, usually." 
25. Letter from Myron Moskovitz, Professor of Law, Golden Gate University, 
to California Chiefs of Police (Sept. 18, 2000) (on file with author). 
26. 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966). 
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A few departments did give me useful information, both orally and 
in writing. My strategy worked, in a sense. My hit rate was small, but 
by sending out a lot of letters, I received enough information to 
conclude that, in general, police officers are taught to handcuff an 
arrestee (preferably behind his back) before searching the area around 
him. Here is a sampling of the replies I received: 
• "Handcuff the arrestee, regardless of the charge, hands 
behind the back, always. Apply handcuffs properly and not 
overly-tight. Always double-lock handcuffs . . . . Get the 
arrestee away from the scene as soon as possible. ,,27 
• "An officer making an arrest while in a duty status shall: 
(A) Identify himself/herself as a police officer in a clear and 
understandable voice . . . (B) Advise the person that he/she is 
being arrested. The arrestee shall also be advised of the 
reason for the arrest as soon as possible. (C) Handcuff the 
arrestee as specified in General Order 3610 'Handcuffs/Flexi-
cuffs. (D) Search the arrestee and the immediate area (within 
legal constraints) for evidence, weapons, or contraband. ,,28 
• "Never allow a subject to reach into a drawer, closet, 
cupboard, etc., to produce valuables. ,,29 
• "Thoroughly search the suspect after· applying the 
handcuffs. ,,30 
• "It is much safer to search a handcuffed prisoner. After 
the handcuffs have been applied whether from a standing, 
kneeling or prone position the person can be searched. ,,31 
• "A search is conducted after handcuffmg an individual 
and the application of the double locking device. A search 
should not be initiated in arrest situations until the individual is 
handcuffed and incapacitated as much as possible. There are 
occasions when a search will be conducted without the use of 
27. MD. POLICE & CORR. TRAINING COMM'N TRAINING UNIT 34: ARREST 
PROCEDURES 9 (rev. Dee. 13, 1999). 
28. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, NAT'L PARK SERVICE, U.S. PARK POLICE, 
GENERAL ORDER 2103.04: ARREST PROCEDURES (as revised on Sept. 30, 1999). Note 
that the search takes place after the arrestee has been handcuffed. See id. 
29. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., AGENCY REGULATION 
§ 6653.3: SEARCH PROCEDURES (n.d.). 
30. BOSTON POLICE DEP'T, RULES AND PROCEDURES: RULE 315, SEC. 6 (n.d.). 
3l. BOSTON POLICE ACAD., TRAINING BULLETIN 26-89: SEARCHING PRISONERS 
(n.d.). 
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cuffs such as consent searches but, generally the individual is 
cuffed and double-locked and then searched.,,32 
• "An uncuffed or unrestrained person could launch an 
attack on the officer during a search of that person. Thus to 
minimize what could be a potentially deadly situation, the 
subject is cuffed or restrained before searching. ,,33 
• "Always handcuff prior to searching. ,,34 
Some of my correspondents noted that officers in the field must 
have the discretion to depart from these general rules when necessary. 
One stated: 
The Sheriff s Office wants its officers to be independent 
thinkers and evaluate each situation independently, and not 
respond like robots following pre-printed commands. Thus, 
the enclosed materials may not contain the level of detail that 
you seek. To further the example proposed in your letter, 
each officer is given the freedom to independently decide if his 
or her safety demands that a suspect be handcuffed and 
removed, before conducting a search, depending upon the 
circumstances presented at the actual crime scene. The 
Sheriff's Office has found that such a policy allows it to better 
serve the public, both victim and suspect. 35 
Some police departments appear to pay close attention to the 
rationale used by Chimel: if the arrestee has been incapacitated, any 
search of the area around him is not justified. They understand the rule 
that emanated from Chimel (the officers may search the area even after 
the arrestee has been incapacitated or even removed), but they don't 
really believe in it. As one training officer told me, "if an officer 
removes the suspect from the. area of arrest, the officer should get a 
32. BALT. COUNTY POLICE DEP'T, EMPLOYMENT & BASIC TRAINING DIV., 
LESSON PLAN: SELF DEFENSE TACTICS, SEARCHING AND PAT DOWNS 1 (2000). 
33. Mo. P.O.S.T. COMM'N, TRAINING MATERIALS 5 (n.d.) (provided by the 
Kansas City Police Department). 
34. ILL. STATE POLICE ACAD., CONTROL AND ARREST TACTICS: LECTURE 
OUTLINE 71 (Mar. 1999). 
35. Letter from Geoffrey S. Allen, Deputy County Counsel, Solano County, 
Cal., to Myron Moskovitz (Sept. 8, 2000) (on file with author). An Oakland, 
California, training officer said that he does not always remove the arrestee from the 
area of arrest, because the arrestee might say "that's mine" or the like when evidence is 
uncovered during a search of the area. Id. "It all depends on how many people are 
around, how many officers are present, and how big and potentially dangerous the 
arrestee is." Telephone Interview with Sgt. J. Israel, Oakland Police Dep't (Aug. 21, 
2000). 
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search warrant before searching the area within the guy's wing span, 
because otherwise [the] search does not seem justified. ,,36 
This sampling cannot compare, of course, with a systematic survey 
of materials used by all police agencies in America. I would love to see 
that done, but such a task will have to be performed by someone with 
access to privileged documents far superior than my very limited 
"outsider's" access. (Note, however, that even a complete study of 
such documents might not capture the full flavor of the information 
transmitted orally in a largely oral police culture.) 
Yet two features of my sampling are notable. 
First, the materials and oral information I received were more 
important for what they did not say than for what they did say. Not one 
regulation, training bulletin, or other piece of information indicated that 
officers were directed or advised to do, as a general practice, what the 
Court in Chimel assumed they would: allow the arrestee to stand 
unrestrained where he was when arrested while the officers conduct a 
search of the area around him. The reason for this is obvious. As one 
department put it, "[t]he safety of officers, citizens, and suspects shall 
be of primary consideration whenever entries, searches, or seizures are 
made or planned. ,,37 
Second, while Chimel;s factual assumptions were based on no 
survey, no sample, and no evidence-nothing but the misguided intuition 
of a group of jurists-my sampling, even with its shortcomings, is better 
36. Telephone Interview with Off. M. Echeverria, Kern County, Cal. Sheriffs 
Dep't (Aug. 28, 2000). Connecticut's Dep't of Public Safety Regulation 19.1.9(b) also 
provides that a search incident to arrest gives a trooper "authority to search an arrested 
person and any thing under his or her immediate control without a search warrant" and 
that ~[t]his exception is based upon the need for a trooper to prevent destruction of 
evidence ' and to seize weapons and things which may aid an escape or which the suspect 
may use to endanger the trooper." See also ARK. STATE POLICE, FIELD OPERATIONS 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL § 3.250: SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST/PROTECTIVE 
SWEEP, which provides: "When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting 
officer to conduct a limited search in order to remove any weapons that might be used to 
resist arrest, effect an escape or cause injury to the officer or others. It is likewise 
reasonable for the officer to conduct a limited search for evidence for the purpose of 
preventing its concealment or destruction. It is important that the Arkansas State Police 
Officer recognizes that the scope of the search authorized by this rule is substantially 
limited." (emphasis added). The training officer for the Massachusetts State Police 
noted that Massachusetts law is more restrictive than Chimel. He said: "I tell my 
officers that after the guy is arrested and removed from the place of arrest, do not go 
back in and search based on the search incident to arrest rule. I tell them to search 
within the lunge area only if he is unrestrained in order to retrieve personal belongings 
to take with him." Telephone Interview with Sgt. P. Didomenica, Mass. State Police 
(Dec. 14, 2000). 
37. SACRAMENTO, CAL. POLICE DEP'T, SEARCH MANUAL: RM 526.01, at ii 
(n.d.). 
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than that. I find it troubling that courts have built up a large body of 
law regulating professional police officers without seeking information 
about what those officers actually do in the field. This is not always the 
case, of course. In Miranda, the Court carefully examined books that 
instruct officers on interrogation methods and then formulated rules 
designed to deal with those methods. 38 Similar efforts should be made 
when dealing with search and seizure issues, even though it might be 
more difficult to understand a disparate oral culture than a smaller, more 
concentrated group that relies on written materials. 39 
The Chimel Court reasoned that the scope of a search incident to 
arrest must be determined by those purposes that justify such a search in 
the first place. As this warrantless search is justified only by the need to 
prevent the arrestee from reaching weapons or evidence, the scope is 
therefore limited to those areas accessible to the arrestee. This makes 
sense, but the Court's application of this reasoning does not. While the 
Court correctly held that the clothing the arrestee is wearing is 
accessible to him, the Court incorrectly held that the area around him at 
the time of arrest is usually accessible to him. In sum, Chimel's positive 
rule was inconsistent with the Court's own rationale. 
Chimel's positive rule is especially hard to justify when the search 
takes place in a home. When applying other search doctrines, the 
Supreme Court has been very protective of the privacy of the home. In 
Vale v. Louisiana,40 for example, police officers obtained warrants for 
Vale's arrest, saw him appear to complete a drug transaction in front of 
his home, and arrested him on the front steps of his home. 41 As they 
were leading him away, they encountered Vale's mother and brother 
38. 384 U.S. at 442-45. 
39. How maya court obtain and evaluate scientific evidence when formulating 
rules of law (as contrasted with resolving individual cases)? Through amicus briefs? Its 
own research? Trial-like procedures? A tough question, but beyond the scope of this 
Article. Others, however, have addressed it. See, for example, James R. Acker, Social 
Science in Supreme Coun Criminal Cases and Briefs, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 26 
(1990), where the author noted "the absence of formal procedures to assist the Court in 
locating or evaluating social science and other social fact information." He continued: 
Legal fact-finding procedures have developed almost exclusively for use in 
trial courts, to help decide the historical, adjudicative facts that are specific 
to individual parties and cases. Consequently, the briefs filed with the Court 
may be the only practical way of calling social science findings to the 
justices' attention and helping to apprise them of the studies' weaknesses and 
limitations. 
ld.; see also supra note 20. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social 
Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. 
L. REV. 477 (1986); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific 
Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1988). 
40. 399 U.S. 30 (1970). 
41. ld. at 32. 
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about to enter the house.42 They then searched the house, finding 
narcotics. 43 The Court assumed that the police had probable cause to 
search the house, but held that a home may not be searched without a 
search warrant or "exigent circumstances" that prevent the police from 
obtaining and returning with a warrant in time to prevent destruction of 
evidence.44 The Court held that the possibility that Vale's mother or 
brother (who saw Vale being led away) would destroy evidence was not 
sufficiently "exigent," because the police could have obtained a search 
warrant when they obtained the arrest warrant. 45 In his dissent, 
however, Justice Black noted that the arrest warrant was issued not 
because of any present misconduct by Vale, but because the bond on a 
prior narcotics charge had been increased. 46 The majority did not feel 
this was sufficient because "only in a 'few specifically established and 
well-delineated' situations may a warrantless search of a dwelling 
withstand constitutional scrutiny, even though the authorities have 
probable cause to conduct it. ,,47 If, however, the police have probable 
cause to believe there is evidence not in a home but in an automobile, 
they may search the car (including the glove compartment and the trunk) 
and all containers (purses, briefcases, etc.) in the car-with no need for 
either a search warrant or exigent circumstances.48 
Chimel's positive rule is very difficult to reconcile with Vale's very 
protective attitude towards the privacy of the home. It seems strange 
that if Vale had been arrested a few feet away-slightly inside the house 
instead of slightly outside-Chimel's positive rule would have allowed 
the police to lead him away, then return and search that part of the 
house that Vale could have reached from the place of arrest, with no 
search warrant and no exigent circumstances. So much for the sanctity 
of the home! 
Other examples of the Court's concern for the privacy of the home 
abound. The Court has held that, while the police need neither an arrest 
warrant nor exigent circumstances to arrest someone in a public place,49 
they need one or the other to forcibly enter a home to arrest. 50 And 
while a police dog does not commit a "search" of luggage at an airport 
42. [d. at 33. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 34. 
45. [d. at 35. 
46. [d. at 40 (Black, 1., dissenting). 
47. [d. at 34 (citation omitted). 
48. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798 (1982). 
49. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
50. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
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by sniffing it,51 an officer's lifting of a turntable to see its serial number 
is a "search" where this occurs in a home,52 and use of a thermal imager 
to detect heat emanating from a home is a "search. ,,53 A forcible entry 
into a home is "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment unless the 
police first "knock and announce" their presence and authority (absent 
exigent circumstances),54 though there is no requirement that they knock 
and announce before entering a car. Use of a beeper installed in a drum 
of chloroform to track the whereabouts of an automobile on a public 
road is not an intrusion on a "justifiable expectation of privacy, ,,55 but 
use of such a beeper to track the movements of the container in a house 
is such an intrusion. 56 It is difficult to reconcile these cases with 
Chimel's "positive" rule. 
B. Robinson 
Chimelled to United States v. Robinson,57 which involved a Search 
of the arrestee himself rather than the area around him. 58 District of 
Columbia police officers arrested Robinson for driving on a revoked 
license. 59 Officer Jenks patted Robinson down, feeling an object in his 
breast pocket. 60 Jenks removed the object-"a 'crumpled up cigarette 
package'" -opened the package, and found heroin. 61 
The Court held that each intrusion (the patdown, the reaching into 
the pocket, and the looking into the cigarette package) was justified by 
the search incident to arrest doctrine. 62 The Court noted "the extended 
exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and 
transporting him to the police station. ,,63 
Justice Marshall dissented. He agreed that the patdown was 
justified by the need to protect the officers from attack with a small 
weapon while transporting Robinson to the police station, and that the 
reach into the pocket might be justified by a similar rationale, but he felt 
51. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
52. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
53. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
54. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); see also Richards v. Wisconsin, 
520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
55. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
56. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
57. 414 U.S. 218; see supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
58. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 223. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 236. 
63. Id. at 234-35. 
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that the look into the package was not justified.64 Applying Chimel's 
rationale for a search incident to arrest, Justice. Marshall found no 
justification for this last search, because Jenks had possession of the 
package and could keep it from Robinson.6s 
The majority disagreed with this "case-by-case" approach, ruling 
that the police need a "bright line" rule that permits them to search 
everything on the arrestee incident to the arrest: 
A police officer's determination as to how and where to search 
the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a 
quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not 
require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of 
each step in the search. The authority to search the person 
incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need 
to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a 
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest 
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon 
the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based 
on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to 
the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of 
the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and 
we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full 
search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 
"reasonable" search under that Amendment. 66 
64. [d. at 250-55. 
65. [d. at 255-56. 
66. [d. at 235. My sampling indicates that the police have their own "bright 
line" rule for how to prevent an arrestee from attacking them during a search: handcuff 
him behind his back: 
• Cincinnati Police Academy's ROLL CALL TRAINING: SCENARIO 
NUMBER 2000-78 (n.d.) states: "If the person is being placed under arrest 
handcuff first then search. " 
• California's Tuolumne County Sheriffs Department states: "For 
officer safety reasons the recruits are trained to handcuff all arrestees that are 
taken into custody and then conduct their search when their 'back-up' 
arrives. " Letter from Lt. James L. Earll to Myron Moskovitz (Aug. 31, 
2000) (on file with author). Another training officer told me that "searching 
the suspect before handcuffing him is a good way to get killed." Telephone 
Interview with Off. G. Powell, Sacramento Police Dep't (Aug. 28, 2000). 
• California's Sonoma County Sheriffs Department guideline, H-2 
HANDCUFFING OF PRISONERS (n.d.), provides: "Never handcuff in the front, 
unless extraordinary circumstanccs occur." 
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Unlike some others,67 I have no serious quarrel with the result in 
Robinson. I suppose (though I have no studies to back me up) that in a 
great majority of cases, there is a possibility that the arrestee has a small 
weapon or evidence of a crime in the clothes he is wearing, and it might 
be possible for even a handcuffed arrestee to move his hands a short 
distance to his clothes to reach such an item. He has plenty of time to 
try, during his transportation to the police station, and if he were to 
succeed in obtaining a weapon, he could do a lot of damage when the 
police unlock the cuffs (if not before). Using a bright line here does not 
cost much in terms of privacy, because (as Justice Powell opined) even 
those few arrestees who are unlikely to be carrying a weapon or 
evidence do not have much privacy in either their persons or their 
belongings after they are arrested. 68 The search of the cigarette pack 
after it was taken from Robinson is a bit more troubling, but I believe 
that might be justified by the rationale of cases upholding inventory 
searches of automobiles and objects found in such inventory searches.69 
Even if Officer Jenks retained custody of the cigarette pack, he needed 
to search it to avoid later claims that he stole something from it (and, 
conceivably, to protect himself from any dangerous object that might be 
in the pack). While this notion might seem strained as to a crumpled 
cigarette pack, it seems sensible when applied to the usual "containers" 
that might be found in the clothing of an arrestee, e.g., a wallet, a coin 
purse, etc. 
But the Court's assertion that the police need a "bright line" led to 
its most troubling extension of the search incident to arrest doctrine: 
New York v. Belton.70 
67. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the 
Fourth Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 841. CRlM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 430-36 (1993); 
see also Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. 
PITI. L. REV. 227, 258 (1984): 
For a person under arrest to attack an armed officer with a safety pin or 
razor blade would be madness, and I am not persuaded that law enforcement 
officers need worry a great deal about the danger. Moreover, when an 
officer does remain apprehensive after a careful frisk, he can handcuff an 
arrestee and lock him in the sealed rear seat of a patrol car. 
68. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 237 ("[A]n individual lawfully subjected to a 
custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his 
person. H). 
69. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-76 (1976). Later, 
however, tbe Court held that an inventory search is permitted only if the officer acts 
pursuant to a police department policy allowing such searches. Florida v. Wells, 495 
U.S. 1,4-5 (1990). 
70. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
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C. Belton 
Belton involved a search of an arrestee's car.7! Trooper Nicot 
stopped a car for speeding.72 While checking the driver's license and 
registration, Nicot smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope marked 
"Supergold" on the floor of the car.73 He ord~red the driver and three 
passengers (including Belton) out of the car and placed them on the 
Thruway. 74 He arrested them for possession of marijuana, patted them 
down, and separated them from each other. 75 He then opened the 
envelope-finding marijuana-and searched the passenger compartment, 
finding cocaine in the pocket of a black leather jacket on the back seat. 76 
The jacket (and, presumably, the cocaine) belonged to Belton, who 
moved to suppress the cocaine.77 The Court held that the search of the 
jacket was incident to the arrest and therefore valid. 78 
In dissent, Justice Brennan saw this holding as a radical departure 
from the principles of Chimel: "When the arrest has been consummated 
and the arrestee safely taken into custody, the justifications underlying 
Chimel's limited exception to the warrant requirement cease to apply: at 
that point there is no possibility that the arrestee could reach weapons or 
contraband. ,,79 
The majority, however, purported to adhere to Chimel's rationale. 
Indeed, the majority insisted that "[o]ur holding today. . .. in no way 
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case 
regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial 
arrests. ,,80 But the majority asserted that "[a] single familiar standard is 
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and 
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests 
involved in the specific circumstances they confront. ,,8! And what 
71. Id. at 456. 
72. See id. at 455. 
73. Id. at 455-56. 
74. Id. at 456. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See id. 
78. Id. at 462-63. 
79. Id. at 465-66; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 15 (1977): 
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal 
property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their 
exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might 
gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search 
of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. 
80. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3. 
81. Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979». 
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"single familiar standard" should apply where the police arrest an 
automobile driver? Here is the Court's answer: 
When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled 
principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot 
know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a 
policeman know the scope of his authority. While the Chimel 
case established that a search incident to an arrest may not 
stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the 
arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of "the area 
within the immediate control of the arrestee" when that area 
arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee 
is its recent occupant. Our reading of the cases suggests the 
generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow 
compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in 
fact generally, even if not inevitably, within "the area into 
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary ite[m]." In order to establish the workable rule 
this category of cases requires, we read Chimel's definition of 
the limits of the area that may be searched in light of that 
generalization. Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman 
has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that 
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. 82 
Is it in fact true that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass 
of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, 
even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might 
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]",?83 I don't think 
so. No sensible police officer will allow an arrestee to remain within 
reach of any such area-he'll get the arrestee out of the car 
immediately.84 
82. Id. at 459-60 (citation omitted). 
83. Id. at 460. 
84. See Alschuler, supra note 67, at 274: 
If any bright line rule had been necessary to resolve the issue in Belton, it 
would have been the opposite of the rule that the Court announced. Indeed, 
the claim that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger 
compartment . . . are ... generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area 
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary 
ite[m)'" was almost as farfetched as the proposition that evidence might have 
been destroyed or a weapon secured on the facts of Belton itself. It is 
difficult to search an automobile while its occupants remain inside. An 
officer who attempts this task constantly must ask the occupants to slide over 
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The Court says that its "generalization" is "suggested" by "our 
reading of the cases. ,,85 But will any assortment of decided appellate 
cases give a fair sampling of how police operate on a day-to-day basis? 
The Court might have been better served by finding some means of 
determining what really happens when the police arrest the driver of an 
automobile. 
My inquiries to various police departments produced some replies 
that bear on this question: 
• "Vehicle searches account for a large number of arrests 
and can be planned and done systematically. Safety issues 
shall be the first priority. A vehicle search shall not be done 
until all occupants of the vehicle have been secured. ,,86 
• "All occupants should be removed from a vehicle before 
searching it and they should not be permitted to stand near the 
vehicle while it is being searched. ,,87 
• "With backup on the scene, remove all occupants from 
the vehicle before you put any part of your body into the car. 
(1) To conduct a proper search, you will have to put yourself 
in awkward positions. (2) Your sidearm may be exposed and 
your attention will be focused on the search of the vehicle. (3) 
Your defensive movements may be limited. ,,88 
and move their feet. Accordingly, the occupants almost invariably are 
removed before an automobile is searched; and once they have been 
removed, there is no longer much chance .that they can secure weapons from 
the automobile or destroy evidence there. 
85. Professor LaFave disagreed with the majority's assertion of what "the cases" 
revealed: 
Any survey of the relevant cases will indicate a number of commonplace 
events which would put the passenger compartment beyond the arrestee's 
control-immediate removal of him to a patrol car or some other place away 
from his own vehicle, handcuffing the arrestee, closure of the vehicle, and 
restraint of the arrestee by several officers, among others. 
Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright 
Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. Pm. L. REv. 307, 329 (1982) (footnotes omitted); see 
also David S. Rudstein, The Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest: An Analysis 
of New York v. Belton, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 205, 226-29, 244-47 (1984) (summarizing 
facts of cases relied on by Belton). 
86. SACRAMENTO, CAL. POLICE DEP'T, supra note 37, at 28. 
87. MD. POLICE & CaRR. TRAINING COMM'N TRAINING UNIT 34, supra note 27, 
at 22. 
88. N.C. DEP'T OF CRIME CONTROL & PuB. SAFETY, BASIC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
TRAINING: TECHNIQUES OF TRAFFIC LAw ENFORCEMENT 37. 
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• "(a) Search the driver and occupants first. (b) Remove all 
occupants while the search is being conducted. ,,89 
• (1) "conduct a professional stop"; (2) "secure the scene, 
prevent interference from witnesses"; etc. (3) "remove the 
subject(s) from the vehicle"; (4) "request back-up if not· 
already present"; (5) "direct the driver out of the vehicle first 
and secure him," "[h ]andcuff and search only if justifiable"; 
(6) "[d]o not place anyone in your patrol car if not 
handcuffed"; and (7) "conduct a systematic search of the 
vehicle-consent or search warrant. ,,90 
• "In removing one or more suspects from the suspect 
vehicle, the primary officer orders the suspects from the 
suspect vehicle, searches and handcuffs them, and secures 
them in the patrol car." The last item in the sequence of 
prescribed events is "Search the suspect's vehicle. ,,91 
• "(a) Never search an occupied vehicle. (b) At night turn 
off your headlights, turn on your interior lights and turn your 
lighted spotlight toward suspect vehicle so that it illuminates 
the back seat of same. (c) With multiple suspects, wait for 
backup; when practical, do so with lone drivers. (d) Ask 
occupants to step to the curb, where they can be searched. (e) 
Group occupants and seat them on the curb. (t) Try to get 
them to spread their legs and place their palms on the 
pavement as a further precaution. (g) While you or backup 
officers conduct a search of the vehicle, the other officer 
maintains surveillance over these individuals. ,,92 
Not a single respondent said or even suggested that a police officer 
should search a vehicle while the arrestee is in the vehicle or unsecured. 
Thus, it appears that Belton's "generalization that articles inside the 
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within the 'area 
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary ite[m]' ,,93 is-at least in general-false. 
The Court in Belton went even further: "It follows from this 
conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any 
89. MICH. STATE POLICE, TRAINING DIV., ARRESTING, HANDCUFFING, 
SEARCHING, AND TRANSPORTING PRISONERS 93 (emphasis omitted) (n.d.). 
90. N.M. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY TRAINING CTR., VEHICLE SEARCH TECHNIQUES: 
BLOCK 7.2.3 (n.d.). 
91. OAKLAND, CAL. POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULLETIN III-B.2 (Dec. 10, 1996). 
92. MISSOURI P.O.S.T. COMM'N, REGULATIONS, supra note 33, at 11. 
93. 453 U.S. at 460. 
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containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger 
compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it 
be within his reach. ,,94 This second generalization is even more 
inconsistent with what police officers actually do in the field. Because 
they are instructed to remove and secure the arrestee before searching 
the vehicle, it is highly unlikely (if not impossible) that an arrestee 
would be able to remove his handcuffs, escape from a police car and/or 
surveillance by a cover officer, run to the vehicle, enter it or reach into 
it, open a container, and remove a weapon or item of evidence-all 
before an officer could intervene and stop him. And yet this strange 
scenario would have to be the norm for Belton to mesh with Chimel's 
rationales for a search incident to arrest. 
The problem can be traced back to the flaw in Chimel itself. 
Chimel's positive rule-allowing the police to search the area around the 
arrestee-did not square with Chimel's own rationale, because a police 
officer who fears a reach for a weapon or evidence will incapacitate the 
arrestee. The Court in Belton could have corrected this mistake, 
disapproving the Chimel dicta. If the Court did this, it could not have 
extended the search incident to arrest doctrine to car searches, because 
officers do not search cars while the arrestee can reach into the car. But 
the Court did not disapprove (or even reexamine) the Chimel dicta. So 
the Belton Court confronted the question of how Chimel applies to this 
new situation: car searches. The Court answered it by ignoring 
Chimel's rationale (the police may search in order to protect themselves 
from the arrestee and prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence), 
even though it said it was basing its decision on Chimel's rationale. 
Justice Brennan's dissent in Belton argued that the majority strayed 
from Chimel, but he too overlooked Chimel's fundamental flaw. 
Chimel's positive . rule was inconsistent with its rationale, though 
Belton's rule was even more inconsistent. 95 
94. Id. 
95. LaFave, supra note 85, at 330: 
Indeed, it is fair to say that applying the traditional search-incident-to-arrest 
rule, which would allow search of that area "from which [the arrestee] might 
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence," is easier in 
automobile cases than in most other circumstances because the police can, 
and typically do, immediately remove the arrestee from the vehicle. Once 
that has been done, it is not difficult to take another step, such as moving 
him farther from the car, handcuffing him, or closing the car door, thus 
ensuring the nonexistence of circumstances in which the arrestee's "control" 
of the car is in doubt. In other words, the "difficulty" and "disarray" the 
Belton majority alluded to has been more a product of the police seeing how 
much they could get away with (by not following the just-mentioned 
procedures) than of their being confronted with inherently ambiguous 
situations . 
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When a rule is not supported by its own rationale, this can lead to 
some very peculiar subsidiary rules. 
One example can be found in a footnote in Belton: "Our holding 
encompasses only the interior of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile and does not encompass the trunk. ,,96 The Court did not 
give any reason for this distinction. Apparently, the Court did pretty 
much what Chimel implied: place the arrestee exactly where he was 
when he was arrested, draw a circle around him with his "wingspan" or 
"lunge area" as the radius, and allow the police to search within that 
area. If the suspect was arrested while in the car, he could then reach or 
lunge into any area of the passenger compartment, but could not reach 
the trunk. This is roughly true, of course, but why it should be relevant 
is a mystery, because when the search takes place, the arrestee will be 
unable to reach either the passenger compartment or the trunk. 
Nevertheless, the Court seems to adopt a judicial fiction-hypothetically 
placing the arrestee back in the car in order to determine the permissible 
scope of the search. 
The Belton Court also added a supplement to this fiction: the officer 
may search the passenger compartment not only when the suspect was 
arrested while in the car, but also when the arrestee was a "recent 
occupant" of the car-so long as the search is "contemporaneous" with 
the arrest (which, of course, will almost always be after the arrest). 
This supplement extends the rule even farther from its rationale, because 
a "recent occupant" might be even further away from the car at the time 
of the search-or even at the time of the arrest! Why did the Court do 
this? No explanation is given, but perhaps the Court felt that this 
expansion of the rule would help furnish "a single familiar standard." 
However, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, the vagueness of the 
word "recent" detracts considerably from the sureness of the rule. 97 
The "recent occupant" expansion might have been essential to the 
Court's holding that Trooper Nicot's search of Belton's jacket was 
96. 453 U.S. at 461 nA. 
97. Id. at 469-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting): 
Thus, although the Court concludes that a warrantless search of a car may 
take place even though the suspect was arrested outside the car, it does not 
indicate how long after the suspect's arrest that search may validly be 
conducted. Would a warrantless search incident to arrest be valid if 
conducted five minutes after the suspect left his car? Thirty minutes? Three 
hours? Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in close proximity to 
the car when the search is conducted? 
As might have been expected, lower court decisions seeking the extent of (and rationale 
for) the "recent occupant" doctrine have been confused and inconsistent. See infra notes 
159-69. The Supreme Court showed some interest in resolving this issue, but thus far 
has failed to do so. See Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774, 776 (2001) (dismissing a 
case in which it had previously granted certiorari for lack of jurisdiction). 
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incident to the arrest, because it is not clear where Belton and the other 
men were when they were arrested. The Court explained that after 
Nicot smelled the burnt marijuana and saw the envelope, "[h]e therefore 
directed the men to get out of the car, and placed them under arrest for 
the unlawful possession of marihuana. ,,98 Were they in the car or out of 
the car at the moment of arrest?99 As they were at least "recent 
occupants," it did not matter, under the Court's new rule. 
Why did the Court find it necessary to establish a "single, familiar 
standard"-a "bright line"-here? Most Fourth Amendment issues are 
resolved by general standards that are not at all "bright": the police need 
"probable cause" to arrest,l00 they may search a home without a warrant 
only with "exigent circumstances," consent to search must be 
"voluntary," the police may conduct a Terry stop only with "reasonable 
suspicion. " 
None of these standards is "bright." Is there anything peculiar 
about an arrest in or near an automobile that gives rise to a greater need 
for a bright line? Once the arrestee is restrained and removed from the 
car-as he will be, almost every time-there is no urgency that prevents 
the officer from going through the same thought process he must go 
through in other search or seizure situations. Indeed, one would think 
that the fleeting nature of a Terry stop would make a bright line even 
more useful there, but the Court has never imposed one. Only on a 
case-by-case basis has the Court examined whether the officer had 
"reasonable suspicion" for a stop. 
98. Belton, 453 U.S. at 456. 
99. The New York Court of Appeals said that the men had already been taken 
outside the car before they were arrested: "After the marihuana was found, the 
individuals, still standing outside the car, were placed under arrest." People v. Belton, 
407 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1980), quoted in Belton, 453 U.S. at 467 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). Justice Brennan felt the "bright line" was fuzzy for additional reasons: 
Even assuming today's rule is limited to searches of the "interior" of cars-
an assumption not demanded by logic-what is meant by "interior"? Does it 
include locked glove compartments, the interior of door panels, or the area 
under the floorboards? Are special rules necessary for station wagons and 
hatchbacks, where the luggage compartment may be reached through the 
interior, or taxicabs, where a glass panel might separate the driver's 
compartment from the rest of the ear? Are the only containers that may be 
searched those that are large enough to be "capable of holding another 
object"? Or does the new rule apply to any container, even if it "could hold 
neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect 
was arrested"? The Court does not give the police any "bright-line" answers 
to these questions. 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
100. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) ("[p]robable cause is a 
flexible, common-sense standard. "). 
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In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,101 the Court expressly rejected a 
defense proposal for a "bright line" test (no valid consent if the officer 
did not advise the suspect of his right not to consent) for the 
voluntariness of consent, preferring a case-by-case examination of 
voluntariness. 102 There are no bright lines defining "probable cause" to 
arrest or search or the "justifiable expectation of privacy" whose 
intrusion creates a "search" in the first place. 103 What, if anything, 
makes the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine different? As Professor 
LaFave notes, "it is necessary for courts to resist the temptation to draw 
new, supposedly 'bright,' lines when in fact existing doctrine is not 
causing serious problems in day-to-day practice. ,,104 
If a bright line is needed in the Belton situation, the following rule 
would seem to be at least as bright as the one adopted by the Court: 
"The police may search an automobile incident to an arrest only in 
extraordinary circumstances (for example, where an injured or disabled 
arrestee cannot be removed from the automobile immediately after the 
arrestlOS or where the arrestor needs to reach into the car in order to 
secure it). 106 They may then search the area within reach of the 
arrestee." This gives the police the guidance they need without 
undermining the rationale of Chimel, and it ensures that the police may 
use other doctrines (the automobile exception, consent, the inventory 
search, etc.) to search the car when appropriate. 
Ironically, none of this was necessary. The Court could have used 
another doctrine to justify Trooper Nicot's search: the so-called 
"automobile" exception. 107 The "Carroll" doctrine allowed police to 
search an automobile when they had probable cause to believe there is 
evidence in an automobile-even without proof that "exigent 
circumstances" prevented them from obtaining a search warrant before 
the evidence might be removed or destroyed. During the term following 
101. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
102. [d. at 248-49. 
103. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51. 
104. LaFave, supra note 85, at 333. See generally Alschuler, supra note 67. 
105. See, e.g., State v. Box, 17 P.3d 386,391 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). 
106. See, e.g., State v. Tolsdorf, 574 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Iowa 1998). But see 
State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 102-03 (Minn. 2000) (finding that where police allow 
the arrestee to return to the car as "a courtesy, not an exigency," they may not search 
incident to the arrest; this rule "encourages officers to follow normal police protocol and 
to not allow vehicles, and the weapons or evidence they may contain, to come within the 
arrestee's immediate control during the arrest"). 
107. The Court was certainly aware of this. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 462 n.6 
("Because of this disposition of the case, there is no need here to consider whether the 
search and seizure were permissible under the so-called 'automobile exception. '") (citing 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United Statcs, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925». 
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Belton, the Court extended Carroll to allow searches of closed 
containers found in the car. \08 It would seem that, after smelling burnt 
marijuana and seeing the envelope marked "Supergold," the trooper had 
probable cause to believe there was marijuana in the car-anywhere in 
the car, including Belton's jacket (and, perhaps, even the trunk!).l09 
Instead, the Court expanded the search incident to arrest doctrine far 
beyond its rationale, thereby breaking faith with the fundamental 
principle that "the scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate 
with the rationale that· excepts the search from the warrant 
requirement"l1°-and sowing a bit of havoc in the lower courts. 111 
Now that both the "Belton car-search-incident-to-arrest" doctrine 
and the "automobile exception" are the law, the resulting combined rule 
a police officer must follow is this: "If I lawfully arrest a 'recent' 
occupant of a car, I may 'contemporaneously' search the passenger 
compartment-but not the trunk, unless I have 'probable cause' to 
believe there is evidence or contraband in the trunk, in which case I may 
search the trunk even if no arrestee 'recently' occupied the car." After 
getting over his bewilderment as to what valid interests are protected by 
such a strange, complex rule, the officer then must guess at what 
"recent," "contemporaneous," and "probable" mean-and then apply 
the correct rule to the correct part of the automobile. And this rule was 
imposed by a Supreme Court that was supposedly trying to help the 
police by establishing a "bright line,,!112 
II. LOWER COURT REACTIONS 
When lower courts believe that they are bound by a rule that does 
not hold up to its own rationale, one can expect conflict and confusion. 
108. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825; see also Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579-80; Rudstein, 
supra note 85, at 261: 
The Court's holding in United States v. Ross grants law enforcement 
personnel significant authority to conduct warrantless searches of 
automobiles and their contents upon probable cause, thereby undermining 
what was perhaps the true reason for its holding in Belton. Because of this, 
the Court should now reconsider its decision in Belton. 
109. On remand, this is just what the New York Court of Appeals held: "[I]n 
light of the discovery of the marihuana-filled envelope on the car floor and the odor of 
the substance, there clearly was reason to believe that the automobile might contain other 
drugs." People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745,748 (1982). 
110. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973). 
Ill. See infra text accompanying notes 155-77. 
112. See supra note 95; see also Robert A. Stern, Comment, Robbins v. 
California and New York v. Belton: The Supreme Court Opens Car Doors to Container 
Searches, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 291, 313 (1982) ("The 'bright line' rule merely 
substitutes new problems for old ones. "). 
682 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
This is just what has happened in cases applying the search incident to 
arrest doctrine to areas in the home and to areas in a car. 
A. Home Searches 
When the arrest has taken place in a home or hotel, many courts 
take a "time of the arrest" approach, holding that Chimel permits a 
search of the area within the arrestee's reach at the time of the arrest-
even if, at the time of the search, the arrestee had been restrained or 
even removed from the area. But a few other courts take a "realistic" 
approach, carefully examining whether the arrestee could in fact have 
reached into the area at the time of the search. 
A leading example of the "time of the arrest" group is United 
States v. Turner.113 Police obtained a warrant to arrest Turner for 
distributing cocaine and for a firearms offense. 1I4 They found him in an 
apartment, in bed. 115 They arrested him, finding a gun under the 
sheets. 1I6 Next, they handcuffed him and took him to a second room.l17 
Then they searched the first room, finding some baggies of cocaine. 118 
Finding the search was valid, the court applied a two-part test: (1) was 
the searched area within the arrestee's control when he was arrested, 
and (2) did events occurring thereafter make the search unreasonable?1I9 
The answer to the first question was clearly yes. 120 The Turner court's 
answer to the second question is thus: 
Next we consider whether subsequent events made the 
search unreasonable. The officers handcuffed Turner and took 
him into the next room out of a concern for safety. We cannot 
say that these concerns were unfounded, for they had already 
discovered a concealed weapon beneath the bedding. They did 
not take him far away or delay for long before conducting the 
search. Under the circumstances, we cannot find the search 
that revealed the baggies of cocaine inconsistent with 
Chimel. 121 
113. 926 F.2d 883 (9th CiT. 1991). 
114. See id. at 885. 
115. [d. at 885-86. 
116. [d. at 886. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. 
119. [d. at 887-88. 
120. [d. at 888. 
121. [d. 
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This reasoning is troubling. The court correctly held that it was 
reasonable for the police to handcuff Turner and remove him from the 
room to prevent him from reaching another weapon he might use to 
attack the police, but why does this make the subsequent search of that 
room "reasonable"? Is the Chimel doctrine part of a game-by validly 
arresting Turner in a room, the police "won the right" to search the 
room, and they shouldn't "lose that right" because they removed Turner 
from the room for a good reason?122 This overlooks the fact that once 
Turner was removed from the room there was no need to search the 
room without a warrant. 
The notion that the Fourth Amendment merely establishes the rnles 
of a game seemed to underlie the holding in United States v. Abdul-
Saboor,123 where the court upheld a search in the defendant's apartment, 
agreeing with the government's contention that "the determination of 
immediate control must be made when the arrest occurs. ,,124 
[I]f the courts were to focus exclusively upon the moment of 
the search, we might create a perverse incentive for an 
arresting officer to prolong the period during which the 
arrestee is kept in an area where he could pose a danger to the 
officer. That danger is not necessarily terminated by the 
arrest. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Belton responding 
to an analogous argument, "no search or seizure incident to a 
lawful custodial arrest would ever be valid [if] by seizing an 
article . . . an officer may be said to have reduced that article 
to his 'exclusive control"'-and thus to have ended the 
defendant's control. Likewise if by arresting and securing the 
defendant, an officer may be said to have put the area where 
the arrest took place under his own control-and thus outside 
the arrestee's "exclusive control"-then, the law would truly 
be, asMr. Bumble said, "a ass. ,,125 
122. See State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Iowa 1917): 
There is no rule which demands the suspect be given a sporting chance to get 
to destructible evidence or deadly weapons before the officer is able to find 
them. We hold the police may see to the safe custody and security of 
suspects first and then make the limited search which the circumstances of 
the particular case permit. 
123. 85 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
124. [d. at 668. 
125. [d. at 669 (citation omitted). This approach might have been unnecessary. 
On the peculiar facts of Abdul-Saboor, the court might have held that this was one of 
those unusual situations where the arrestee might have been able to reach a weapon at 
the time of the search: "Abdul-Saboor had specifically requested entry to the area 
searched [to get some clothes]; once there, he seized and attempted to hide a loaded 
handgun." [d. at 670. 
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Peculiar reasoning. Because the court does not trust the good faith 
of the police officer, it gives the officer authority to search more of the 
arrestee's home than he needs to in order to protect himself. (What do 
you make of that, Mr. Bumble?) In addition, the court relies on a quote 
from Belton (a car case, not a home case) that has always puzzled me. 
The quoted language seems to say that if a rule does not comport with 
its rationale, then the rationale-not the rule-must be wrong! 
Belton was invoked again in State v. Murdock,126 where the 
defendant was arrested in his apartment. 127 The majority allowed a 
search of the area around him at the time of the arrest-relying in part 
on Belton's quest for "bright lines": 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Chimel standard 
authorizes a contemporaneous, limited search of the area 
immediately surrounding the arrestee measured at the time of 
the arrest without consideration to actual accessibility to the 
area searched. This is a simple, practical rule. Its sanction of 
a contemporaneous, limited search protects the individual's 
privacy interests in areas outside his or her immediate control 
and also serves valid societal interests in protecting officer 
safety and preserving evidence. 128 
A dissenting justice disagreed: "I do not believe a car and a home can be 
equated in search and seizure law. ,,129 As I indicated earlier, this 
statement is certainly supported by the Supreme Court's consistent. 
disparate treatment of cars and homes. 
In United States v. Tavolacci,130 the court adhered to prior decisions 
adopting the "time of arrest" approach, noting: "This is one area of 
criminal procedure in which the courts have achieved some degree of 
clarity, refraining from any slippery test of actuai necessity. We see no 
need to introduce new confusion. ,,131 This sounds like a "bright-line" 
justification, but it really isn't. The "time of arrest" approach does not 
eliminate the often-difficult task (mandated by Chimel) of determining 
how far the arrestee could reach-it simply poses that question at the 
time of arrest rather than the time of the search. It is no more clear and 
no less "slippery" than a "time of search" approach, but it is less 
126. 155 Wis. 2d 217,455 N.W.2d 618 (1990). 
127. Id. at 222,455 N.W.2d at 619. 
128. Id. at 236,455 N.W.2d at 626. 
129. Id. at 238,455 N.W.2d at 627 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
130. 895 F.2d 1423 (D.C. CiT. 1990). 
131. Id. at 1429. 
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consistent with the rationale for allowing a search incident to arrest at 
all. 
Some courts have allowed the police to search the area around a 
handcuffed arrestee who has not been removed from the place of arrest. 
In People v. Hufnagel,132 the court justified such a ruling: "[S]ince 
handcuffs can fail, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the 
area the arrestee could reach after breaking free from them. ,,133 The 
court cited no studies showing that handcuffs fail with any frequency, 
and the literature I received from various police departments suggests 
that officers take careful precautions to ensure that they do not fail. 134 
The possibility of handcuffs failing seems a thin reed on which to rest a 
general rule allowing a warrantless search of a home-particularly since 
the police can (and usually do) remove the arrestee from the area after 
handcuffing him. 
Normally, if the police choose not to remove a handcuffed arrestee 
from the area of arrest, they demonstrate their own belief that the 
handcuffs and presence of officers will prevent the arrestee from 
reaching into the area. I can, I suppose, think of situations where this 
might not be so. Perhaps a single officer has arrested several suspects 
and feels that it is not safe to remove the suspects until back-up officers 
arrive (though one wonders why it would be safer for the officer to 
search the area instead of keeping his eye on the suspects). Or perhaps 
the officer has reason to fear that friends of the arrestee might reach for 
a weapon while the officer is securing the arrestee. 135 Or maybe the 
arrestee is struggling and resisting application of handcuffs. 136 If a court 
is persuaded that one of these unusual situations is present, then the area 
search should be allowed. 
While many courts rule as Turner and Abdul-Saboor did,137 a few 
courts take a more "realistic" approach. In People v. Summers,138 the 
132. 745 P.2d.242 (Colo. 1987). 
133. Id. at 247. 
134. See supra Part I.A. 
135. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d 189, 193 (7th Cir. 1990). 
136. See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51,55 (6th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424, 427 (lOth Cir. 1971). 
137. E.g., Watkins, 564 F.2d at 205: 
It is true, as Appellant contends, that Appellant had been subdued and 
presented no danger to the police at the time the suitcase was opened. Nor 
was there the possibility that the evidence in the suitcase would be destroyed 
as the suitcase was under the control of the police. However, the authority 
to conduct a search incident to an arrest, once established, still exists even 
after the need to disarm and prevent the destruction of evidence have been 
dispelled. 
id.; see also In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("The 
critical time for analysis, however, is the time of the arrest and not the time of the 
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majority stated: "where there is no threat to the officers because the 
suspect has been immobilized, removed; and no one else is present, it 
makes no sense that the place he was removed from remains subject to 
search merely because he was previously there. ,,139 A concurring 
opinion disagreed: "The right to search attaches at the moment of arrest. 
I am not offended, the federal courts are not offended, and most 
importantly the Constitution is not offended by allowing police to delay 
exercise of that right until they can do so safely. ,,140 Others, however, 
might well be "offended" by a rule that fails to conform to its own 
rationale. 
In Stackhouse v. State,141 a police officer arrested Stackhouse in the 
attic of his home, then took him down to the second floor and 
handcuffed him.142 The officer then returned to the attic and searched it, 
finding a shotgun barrel. 143 The court held that the search was not 
justified by the search incident to arrest doctrine: 
First is the question of whether the search is justified 
under Chimel as within the area of appellant's reach or grasp. 
search."); United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 606, 609-10 (8th Cir. 1990); Davis v. 
Robbs, 794 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Under the circumstances prevailing at the 
time of the plaintiffs arrest, including Davis' immediate proximity to the loaded rifle 
which was in clear view and easily accessible to him, the police were lawfully entitled to 
seize the rifle after having placed the plaintiff into the squad car. "); United States v. 
Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wright, 577 F.2d 378, 
380 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kaye, 492 F.2d 744, 746 (6th Cir. 1974): 
Appellant's suitcase was within that area at the time of his arrest. It is true, 
as Appellant contends, that Appellant had been subdued and presented no 
danger to the police at the time the suitcase was opened. Nor was there the 
possibility that the evidence in the suitcase would be destroyed as the 
suitcase was under the control of the police. However, the authority to 
conduct a search incident to an arrest, once established, still exists even after 
the need to disarm and prevent the destruction of evidence have been 
dispelled. 
id.; State v. Noles, 546 P.2d 814, 817-18 (Ariz. 1976); People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 
N.E.2d 499, 508 (N. Y. 1973) ("[T]he fact that the police had handcuffed the defendant 
did not render the closet search unauthorized . . . it is not at all clear that the' grabbing 
distance' authorized in the Chimel case is conditioned upon the arrested person's 
continued capacity 'to grab'. "). In addition, several other Ninth Circuit cases have 
followed Turner. See United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1419 (9th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tarazon, 
989 F.2d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 1993). 
138. 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999). 
139. [d. at 390. 
140. [d. at 393 (Bedsworth, J., concurring). 
141. 468 A.2d 333 (Md. 1983). 
142. [d. at 336. 
143. [d. 
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We hold that it was not. Appellant was out of the attic and 
handcuffed; therefore, it cannot be argued that, from the floor 
below, the area of the attic was within his grasp. 144 
687 
A number of other cases agree with this approach, examining whether 
the searched area was within the arrestee's reach at the time of the 
search rather than at the time of arrest. 145 Courts using this approach 
almost never uphold the search under the search incident to arrest 
doctrine. 146 This is to be expected, of course, because police officers 
are not fools. As the answers to my inquiries revealed, they will 
normally restrain and remove the arrestee from the scene of arrest as 
soon as possible in order to protect themselves. 
144. [d. at 342. 
145. See, e.g., United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321,330 (D.C. Cir. 1983): 
The search of the closet in the instant case clearly was beyond the pale 
demarcated by Chimei and its progeny. At the time of the search, Lyons 
was sitting, handcuffed, on a chair near the doorway. Inside the room were 
six police officers, at least four of whom presumably were armed. The 
closet was located at the far end of the wall adjacent to that in which the 
doorway was located-several yards away from Lyons. Under these 
circumstances, it is inconceivable that Lyons could have gained access to the 
area. 
id.; United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056,1062 (5th Cir. 1980): 
At the time the search was made Cueto and Bavosa were both handcuffed 
and subdued; the record suggests that they had already been removed from 
the room. The defendants. were certainly in no position to reach concealed 
weapons or to grab and destroy evidence in the suitbag or between the 
mattresses. 
id.; United States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[T]he seizure 
cannot be sanctioned as a search incident to arrest. Appellant was shackled to Sansone 
on a bed and the billfold was clearly out of his reach or immediate control. "); United 
States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The record in this case reveals that 
the closet in which the heroin packages were found was closed at the time of search. "); 
United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103, 105 (lOth Cir. 1969) ("[I]t cannot be said that the 
inside of his bureau drawers, night stand, under the bed or any similar area was under 
any type of control by Baca inasmuch as he was handcuffed with his hands behind his 
back and was unable even to dress himself. "); State v. Cook, 332 S.E.2d 147, 155 (W. 
Va. 1985): 
[W]here the three arrestees, two of them handcuffed, were apparently seated 
on a bed with one or more shotguns pointed at them, the arresting officer's 
search of the top of the dresser outside of the area of their physical control 
was clearly unnecessary under either the law enforcement safety or 
protection of evidence rationales for both the "incident to a valid arrest" and 
"plain view" doctrines. 
146. Well, hardly ever. See Voelkel v. State, 629 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1982) ("It is not unreasonable to expect that Ms. Voelkel, although frontally 
handcuffed, could have obtained a weapon or destroyed evidence in the clothing bag and 
cigarette case. H). 
688 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
In United States v. Griffith,147 officers arrested Griffith in his room 
but did not restrain him: "They did not handcuff him, and they allowed 
him to walk about the room to get dressed instead of bringing his clothes 
to him." 148 The court apparently suspected that the officers had the 
"perverse motive" alluded to above in United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 
but this led to the opposite conclusion: 
If the freedom thus permitted defendant created the 
danger that he would walk within reach of the brown paper 
sack-and the record does not even show that it did-the 
danger was of the officers' own making. Just as "Chimel does 
not permit the arresting officers to lead the accused from place 
to place and use his presence in each location to justify a 
'search incident to the arrest,'" it does not permit the officers 
to achieve the same result by ordering the accused to dress and 
then not bringing him his clothes, thus requiring him to move 
about the room in order to comply with their directions. The 
officers' only legitimate purpose in being in the room was to 
make an arrest. They did not have the right to create a 
situation which gave them a pretext for searching beyond the 
area of defendant's immediate control. The officers could 
have handed him whatever clothes he needed in order to dress. 
They could then have posted a guard on the room, obtained a 
search warrant, and later returned to search the room pursuant 
to the warrant. 149 .. 
Somehow, I doubt that Mr. Bumble would characterize this sensible 
reasoning as "a ass." 
Occasionally, of course, the police may have good reason not to 
restrain or remove the arrestee immediately (e.g., where the arrestee 
needs to obtain some clothes), and here the police should be allowed to 
search the area he might reach into. ISO But this exceptional situation 
should not be the basis for a general rule allowing the search of an area 
of the home incident to the arrest. On occasion, the police might not 
restrain the arrestee simply because they do not fear him for some 
reason (e.g., reputation, age, or disability). If they do not fear that he 
might reach into an area for a weapon or evidence, it makes little sense 
to allow them to search that area anyway. 
147. 537 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976). 
148. [d. at 904. 
149. [d. (citation omitted). 
150. Courts have had no trouble allowing a search in this situation. See, e.g., 
Watkins, 564 F.2d at 205; Jones, 767 P.2d at 238. 
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Which approach-the "time of arrest" approach or the "time of 
search" approach-is correct? As I've indicated above, I believe that the 
"time of search" approach more correctly follows the traditional 
principle that a doctrine that permits warrantless searches must be based 
on a sound rationale. But which approach is the "correct" interpretation 
of Chimel? Are the "time of arrest" cases aberrations that do not really 
understand Chimel (or are deliberately trying to extend it past its 
rationale)? It might be hard to call them "aberrations," as they seem to 
make up the majority approach in the lower courts (though I haven't 
done a complete count). But do they correctly interpret Chimel? This is 
a difficult question. 
The language used in Chimel is not clear on this point. 
Immediately after saying that the police may search the, person of the 
arrestee, the Court stated: 
[T]he area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab 
a weapon or evidentiary items'must, of course, be governed by 
a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one 
who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as 
one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. lSI 
On the one hand, one could say that this language supports the 
"time of search" approach. Because it permits searches into "the area 
into which an arrestee might reach,'~ an area search is permitted only 
when the "gun on a table or in a drawer;' is "dangerous to the arresting 
officer," and only if the arrestee can in fact reach it at the time of the 
search. IS2 
But on the other hand, because in the real world this is hardly ever 
a serious possibility at the time of, the search, such an interpretation 
would effectively eviscerate Chimel's positive rule (insofar as it applies 
to area searches). Arguably, the Supreme Court did not intend to 
151. Chimel, 395 U.s. at 763. 
152. This is not the only way to read Chimel. Professor Bradley apparently read 
it to support the "time of arrest" approach: ' 
[T]he Chimel Court also allows warrantless, no-probable-cause searches for 
evidence of areas within the "immediate control" of the arrestee, apparently 
without regard to whether the arrest is for an offense that could produce 
evidence or whether the arrestee in the instant case actually has a capacity to 
grab for anything. ' 
Bradley, supra note 67, at 451. Professor Bradley went on to criticize Chimel: 
[T]he Court should not permit a search for weapons unless there is an 
immediate danger that cannot be diffused by less intrusive means, such as 
handcuffing the suspect, and warrantless searches for evidence, should be 
forbidden absent both probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
[d. at 452. 
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announce a rule only to have lower courts hold that it rarely applies. 153 
Arguably, the Supreme Court did not intend its ruling to be 
meaningless, and lower courts are not empowered to undercut such a 
ruling in a way that makes it meaningless. Arguably, like it or not, to 
be faithful to Chimel, lower courts must adopt the "time-of-arrest" 
approach. And it now seems clear than many lower courts will continue 
to do just that-until the Supreme Court cures this problem by clarifying 
(or disapproving) Chimel's positive rule insofar as it applies to area 
searches. 
B. Car Searches 
If Chimel created confusion, Belton begat bedlam. Here is the 
difficulty. While suspects arrested at home are occasionally allowed to 
remain in the place of arrest during the search, this almost never 
happens to suspects arrested in a car. I have read many reported 
decisions on car searches, and I have yet to see a case where this has 
happened. 154 This is understandable. As one court acknowledged, "[i]t 
seems quite likely that, in instances where occupants of a car are 
arrested, they will be outside the car and will have been placed under 
some measure of security before the car is searched. ,,155 The materials 
sent to me by various police departments show that it would be quite 
dangerous for an officer to assume the awkward positions needed to 
search a car while an unrestrained suspect is close by. Officers are 
instructed to remove the suspect from the car before beginning the 
search. Thus, in virtually every case, a search of a car incident to an 
arrest will involve an arrest of a former occupant of the car. As one 
court put it, after the arrest of an occupant of a car, "his wingspan had 
been clipped and his grabbable area was a police cruiser rather than his 
153. As noted above, the majority in Belton said something very similar in 
rejecting defendant's argument that the police may not use the search incident to arrest 
doctrine to justify the search of an object they have seized from the grabbable area: 
"[N]o search or seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest would ever be valid; by 
seizing an article even on the arrestee's person, an officer may be said to have reduced 
that article to his 'exclusive control' [-and thus to have ended the defendant's control]." 
453 U.S. at 462 n.5. 
154. There are, however, a handful of cases where the officer might have planned 
to allow the arrestee to return to the car. See, e.g., United States v. Holifield, 956 F.2d 
665,668-69 (7th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
155. United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1988); see also United 
States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803,817-18 (7th Cir. 1997). Following Belton, however, 
the Karlin and Sholola courts went on to hold that the search of the car of the restrained· 
and removed arrestee was justified by the search incident to arrest doctrine. Karlin, 852 
F.2d at 971-72; Sholola, 124 F.3d at 818. 
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own vehicle. ,,156 Nevertheless, lower courts have rather consistently 
ruled that Belton allows a search of the car incident to the arrest of an 
occupant who was not in or near the car at the time of the search. 157 
Belton allowed a search of the car "contemporaneous" with the 
arrest of a "recent occupant" of the. car. But what do 
"contemporaneous" and "recent" mean? These terms are vague, but 
lawyers, judges, and police officers applying the Fourth Amendment are 
used to dealing with vague terms: "probable cause," "reasonable 
suspicion, " "justifiable expectation of privacy, " and "voluntary 
consent," to name a few. These terms can be interpreted by applying 
the policy behind them. "Probable cause" is the balance point between 
the individual's need for privacy and the government's need to find 
evidence relating to crime. "Reasonabl,e suspicion" is the balance point 
between the individual's liberty of movement and the government's need 
to investigate people who might have committed, or who will commit, a 
crime. Tough to do, but doable. But what is the policy behind 
"contemporaneous" and "recent occupant"? With no guidance from the 
Supreme Court, lower courts have been left to their own devices to find 
one. 
In United States v. Cotton,158 the court came up with this rationale 
for allowing the search of a car after the arrestee has been removed and 
restrained: 
The facts surrounding each arrest are unique and it is not by 
any means inconceivable under those various possibilities that 
an arrestee could gain control of some item within the 
automobile. The law simply does not require the arresting 
officer to mentally sift through all these possibilities during an 
156. State v. Gonzalez, 487 N.W.2d 567,570 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992). 
157. See, e.g., Rudstein, supra note 80, at 246: 
In a significant number of cases courts have upheld searches on the basis of 
Belton even though the arrestee was sitting in a police cruiser-in some cases 
even handcuffed-when the police searched the passenger compartment of 
his vehicle or a container found therein. Courts have reached the same 
result in cases in which the arrestee, although not in a squad car, was either 
handcuffed or restrained in some other manner by police officers at the time 
of the search. Yet, in none of these cases can it realistically be said that the 
arrestee could have reached into the passenger compartment, or a container 
located therein, in order to grab a weapon or to destroy or conceal evidence. 
To argue otherwise is to engage upon a flight of fancy. 
More recent cases have done the same. See Statev. Greenwald, 858 P.2d 36, 41-
42 (Nev. 1993) (Steffen, 1., dissenting) (summarizing cases); see also United 
States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 825-26 (I Ith Cir. 1996); Gonzalez, 487 N.W.2d 
at 571; Pack v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 921,922-23 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). 
158. 751 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1985). 
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arrest, before deciding whether he may lawfully search within 
the vehicle. 
The evolution of the law regarding the warrantless 
searches of automobiles has of necessity followed a different 
path than that of searches incident to lawful arrest in general. 
The arrestee may have hidden, within the close proximity of 
the car interior, either weapons or contraband which are easily 
obtainable. He also has a significantly lessened privacy 
interest in the objects found within the car than he would in 
objects found within his home. 159 
True, it is not "inconceivable" that an arrestee could gain access to 
the car at the time of the search, but these would be very unusual 
circumstances. 160 Certainly they would not be the norm, as the materials 
sent to me by various police departments (as well as common sense) 
show: for officer safety, get the guy away from the car before you 
search it! It seems strange to create a general rule applicable to all 
arrests of car occupants based on a situation that one may "conceive" 
only with substantial effort. This is not how the law operates in an 
analogous area: courts do not permit a frisk for weapons during a Terry 
stop where the officer has no reasonable suspicion that the suspect is 
armed and dangerous-even though it is "conceivable" that such a 
suspect might carry a weapon. 161 
Cotton's second rationale, the "lessened privacy interest" in a car, 
is relevant, but as the Supreme Court held in Ross and Acevedo, it is not 
sufficient by itself to justify the search of a car. "Lessened" is not the 
same as "none" -one does retain some privacy interest in a car and the 
objects one places in it, and for this reason the "automobile exception" 
requires the officer to have probable cause to believe there is evidence 
of a crime in the car in order to search it (though he does not need 
exigent circumstances preventing him from getting a search warrant). 
Some courts have held that an arrestee was a "recent occupant" of 
a car if he was in the car when the police first "initiated contact" with 
him. 162 In People v. Savedra,163 the Supreme Court of Colorado 
proposed a rationale for this distinction: 
159. [d. at 1148. 
160. But see supra notes 106-07. 
161. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 
(1968); People v. Rivera, 650 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); People v. 
Morgan, 484 N.E.2d 1292, 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Simpler v. State, 568 A.2d 22, 
27 (Md. 1990). 
162. See, e.g., United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 159 (6th Cir. 1993); Thomas v. State, 761 So. 
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Prior to police contact, one of the occupants could have chosen 
to hide something in the vehicle to avoid discovery by the 
police. If Belton were read to preclude a search in this 
situation where police contact occurred just after the suspect 
exited his vehicle, then knowledgeable suspects could 
effectively conceal evidence by stepping outside of their 
vehicle whenever they saw a police officer approaching. 164 
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An admirable effort, but the court asks us to accept a general rule 
by assuming that the average criminal would be "knowledgeable" about 
Belton ,and about lower court cases interpreting it, and also 
"knowledgeable" about the "automobile exception," inventory searches, 
and other legal doctrines that might permit a search of the car whether 
he exited the car or not. Quite a stretch. I can't assume that my law 
students are "knowledgeable" about all of this after a full semester of 
studying these cases! 
Other courts hold that Belton allows the search of a car even when 
police did not "initiate contact" until after the suspect left the car.165 In 
Glasco v. Commonwealth, police arrested Glasco (for driving with a 
suspended license) after he had parked the car and began walking 
away.166 Police then searched the car, and the court upheld the search: 
2d lOW, 1013 (Fla. 1999); State v. Foster, 905 P.2d 1032, 1037-38 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1995) (discussing cases related to a search incident to arrest). 
163. 907 P.2d 596 (Colo. 1995). 
164. Id. at 600. The court then quoted a Nebraska opinion: 
In order to conduct a valid search, police officers should not have to race 
from their vehicles to the arrestee's vehicle to prevent the arrestee from 
getting out of his or her vehicle. If this were the rule, the quick and the 
speedy suspect could always create a sanctuary for weapons or contraband 
by getting out of the vehicle and surrendering to the officer first. 
Id. (citing Gonzalez, 487 N.W.2d at 572). A recent Colorado case viewed the situation 
more realistically-but nevertheless felt bound to do the wrong thing (holding' that a 
search of the car incident to the arrest of the driver was valid even though the driver was 
handcuffed and being driven to the police station in a patrol car when the search began): 
Here, ... there was no possibility that defendant could obtain a weapon or 
destroy evidence once he was in the police car, and thus, the very bases for a 
search incident to arrest appear not to have been present. Nevertheless, as 
noted, the [Colorado] [S]upreme [C]ourt cases have emphasized the 
importance of the temporal proximity between the police encounter and the 
defendant's presence in the vehicle, irrespective of the defendant's location 
at the time of the vehicle search. 
People v. Graham, No. 99CA2314, 2001 Colo. App. LEX IS 1610, at *8 (Colo. Ct. 
App. Sept. 27, 2001). 
165. See, e.g., United States v. Snook, 88 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1996). 
166. 513 S.E.2d 137, 140 (Va. 1999). 
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[W]e are not persuaded by the authorities that have decided 
that an arrestee is an. occupant or recent occupant of an 
automobile only if the police officer initiates contact with the 
arrestee before that person exits the vehicle. That kind of 
limitation assumes that an individual, who voluntarily gets out 
of an automobile, is not aware of the presence of a police 
officer, or having such knowledge, it did not prompt the 
person to exit the vehicle. We do not. believe that those 
assumptions are always warranted. Moreover, a 
knowledgeable suspect has the same motive and opportunity to 
destroy evidence or obtain a weapon as the arrestee with whom 
a police officer has initiated contact. That suspect could also 
conceal evidence in the vehicle and effectively prevent an 
officer from discovering it by getting out of his or her 
automobile. 167 
Granted, those assumptions might not "always" be warranted, but it 
seems odd· to allow a warrantless search in many cases merely because it 
might be justified in a few. As a concurring judge reasoned in Glasco, 
"the mere ability of a citizen to put evidence out of the reach of law 
enforcement by placing it within an area protected by the right to 
privacy is not sufficient to justify a warrantless search. "168 
Belton's requirement that the search be "contemporaneous" with 
the arrest also seems to have baffled the lower federal courts. In United 
States v. Vasey,169 the Ninth Circuit held that thirty to forty-five minutes 
was too long to be "contemporaneous, ,,170 while in United States v. 
167. [d. at 141-42; see also State v. Wanzek, 598 N.W.2d 811,815 (N.D. 1999). 
[T]hese decisions raise grave public policy issues because they create serious 
concerns for the safety of officers and others. By drawing a distinction 
between an occupant and a recent occupant of a vehicle, we would 
encourage individuals to avoid lawful searches of their vehicles by rapidly 
exiting or moving away from the vehicle as officers approached. Police 
officers should not have to race from their vehicles to the arrestee's vehicle 
to prevent the arrestee from getting out of the vehicle in order to conduct a 
valid search. If Belton is read to preclude· searches where police contact 
occurs after the suspect exits the vehicle, suspects could conceal evidence 
and weapons by merely stepping outside the vehicle whenever they saw an 
officer approaching. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
168. 513 S.E.2d at 145 (Lacy, 1., concurring). Justice Lacy also argued: "If 
there is no connection shown between a person's occupancy of a vehicle and his arrest, 
then extending the scope of the search incident to arrest to the vehicle is neither 'tied to' 
nor 'justified by' circumstances of the arrest." [d. at 144. 
169. 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987). 
170. [d. at 787. 
2002:657 Empirical Reexamination of Chimel 695 
McLaughlin,171 the Ninth Circuit held that five minutes was fine-
because the officer used that five minutes to complete paperwork 
relating to impounding defendant's car, and thus "the search in this case 
occurred during a continuous series of events closely connected in time 
to the arrest.,,172 But why should this matter? Whether forty-five 
minutes, five minutes, or one minute, if the arrestee has been restrained 
and moved to a place where he can no longer reach the car before the 
search, what justifies the search? If the rationale for allowing the search 
is a mystery, then defining "contemporaneous"-as a matter of Fourth 
Amendment policy-is a futile quest. Concurring in McLaughlin, Judge 
Trott voiced his frustration: 
So the law regarding searches incident to arrest now reads 
something like, "well, thirty-minutes is too long, but five 
minutes is okay and you can delay if you are filling out 
paperwork but not if you are interrogating or transporting the 
defendant." So much for bright lines. 
The tragedy is not just that the rule is now so unclear that 
it provides little guidance to law enforcement. Of greater 
concern is the reality that the search incident to arrest 
exception has been completely severed from the historic 
rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence. The 
questions now revolve around when and how, not why. 
The case before us illustrates this perfectly. McLaughlin 
was pulled over for having an illegally tinted rear window. He 
was then arrested because the police discovered there was an 
outstanding warrant for failure to appear. The search in no 
way furthered officer safely [sic]: McLaughlin was handcuffed 
and taken away. There was no evidence to preserve. 
Analytically-given the evaporation of the inventory search 
basis-the search was a fishing expedition-a purely 
exploratory search-plain and simple. 173 
Judge Trott concluded by noting "the absurdity associated with allowing 
purely exploratory searches incident to arrest. Cessante ratione legis 
cessat et ipsa lex. ['The reason for the law ceasing, the law also 
ceases. ']"174 I could not have put it better myself. 
I don't mean to sound unduly critical of lower federal court 
opinions. These judges are doing the best they can to make lemonade 
171. 170 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 1999). 
172. [d. at 891. 
173. [d. at 895 (Trott, J., concurring). 
174. [d. 
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out of a real lemon. They have no choice but to follow Belton,175 and 
they are trying to make some sense of it. As Judge Trott explained so 
eloquently, however, it just can't be done.176 
III. CONCLUSION 
In 1971, the Supreme Court summarized its prior Fourth 
Amendment rulings as follows: 
Thus the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions." The exceptions 
are "jealously and carefully drawn," and there must be "a 
showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies 
of the situation made that course imperative." "[T]he burden 
is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it. ,,177 
175. Some state courts have simply refused to follow Belton, holding that their 
state constitutions or statutes protect privacy more than the Fourth Amendment (as 
interpreted by Belton) does. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 180, 184 (Kan. 
1996); State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982); State v. Brown, 588 
N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio 1992); State v. Kirsch, 686 P.2d 446,448 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). 
Some courts appeared to ignore Belton rathcr than expressly disapprove it. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264 (Mass. 1983); Greenwald, 858 P.2d at 36. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to apply Beiton to warrantless arrests for motor 
vehicle offenses. Pierce, 642 A.2d at 959. See generally Catherine Hancock, State 
Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REV. 1085 (1982); J. Tim 
Thomas, Note, Belton Is Not Welcome: Idaho's Rejection and Subsequent Adoption of 
the Belton Rule in State v. Charpentier, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 125 (1998). 
176. As Professor Alschuler put it, "when the rule is artificial, delimiting its 
boundary becomes a matter of guesswork." Alschuler, supra note 62, at 231; see also 
id. at 285 ("[N]onsense is likely to yield nonsense, and nonsense rules are likely to 
prove difficult to apply. "). In his dissent in People v. Brosnan, 298 N.E.2d 78, 86 
(N.Y. 1973), Judge Wachtler stated: "[S]earch and seizure law [becomes] uncontrollable 
when the rubric [is] adopted and the rationale discarded." 
For a summary of the confusion among lower courts applying Belton before 1987, 
see David M. Silk, Comment, When Bright Lines Break Down: Limiting New York v. 
Belton, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 281 (1987). The comment concludes: 
Thcse decisions, of course, demonstrate a fundamental failure of the Belton 
rule. Different courts have used the reasoning of the Belton decision-the 
need to create a workable bright line rule-to find support for directly 
conflicting results. In this area, Belton fails to guide police conduct, fails to 
provide citizens with an idea of the scope of their rights, and fails to ensure 
consistent results. 
Id. at 300. 
177. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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It may well be that the· force of this statement has been diluted 
somewhat by decisions rendered by the Court since 1971. Nevertheless, 
the Court has remained faithful to its essence. Therefore, any 
"exception" to the "warrant requirement" should at least not be 
arbitrary. It should be based on some real need to search. 
Is there anything about the fact of an arrest qua arrest that tends to 
justify a search? Well, yes. An arrest is often a traumatic event for a 
suspect. One moment he is free, and the next moment he is in the 
custody of the police. And he might realize that this custody can turn 
into a lengthy prison term if the police obtain more evidence to convict 
or add further charges. In this emotional state, the arrestee might seek 
to harm the arresting officers in order to escape, and he might try to 
dispose of any evidence that might enhance this likelihood of conviction 
or lead to further charges. But the police are neither stupid nor helpless. 
They can and will prevent these actions-first and foremost by 
restraining and removing the suspect from any area that might contain a 
weapon or evidence. If they arrest him in his home, they will handcuff 
him and remove him from the home. If they arrest him in a car, they 
will remove him from the car and then handcuff him. Common sense 
tells us this, and the police themselves tell us that this is what they in 
fact do. There might be occasional exceptions. 178 But if the Court 
honors its purported commitment to the Fourth Amendment even 
slightly, it should form its general rule based on what the police 
normally do, not on the exceptions. 
In sum, the fact of custodial arrest should allow the police to search 
the clothing the arrestee is wearing, but not the area around him, unless 
particular and unusual facts justify such a search. The Court should 
reexamine Chimel and Belton. 
178. See supra notes 18, 106-07, 155. 
